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Abstract 
 
 
Due to the expansion of Indigenous academic scholarship in the past 
few decades, Indigenous theorists have struggled with the implementation of 
sovereignty.  Recently, the concept of autonomy has entered the struggle.  
Sovereignty is generally understood as absolute political authority, autonomy 
as self-government.  The relationship between sovereignty and autonomy 
with respect to Tribal Nations concerns two conceptualizations of the inherent 
right to manage their affairs free from external influence.  Federal policies 
from settler governments such as the United States have denied this right.  
Therefore, this thesis examines the dimensions and limitations of the 
concepts of sovereignty and autonomy based on a category of Indigenous 
theorists devised within this thesis.  The category of Indigenous theorists is 
used to trace how sovereignty has been conceptualized to express the 
inherent right of Tribal Nations to govern as they deem fit.  Autonomy is 
critically analyzed in this thesis pursuant to the category of Indigenous 
theorists as an alternative political objective for Tribal Nations.     
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“We should master these concepts so we can do battle with them and turn 
their inconsistencies around, substituting tribal perspectives wherever we 
can.” 
Vine Deloria Jr. 
 “They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only 
opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real 
existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world.” 
Marx and Engels 
Introduction 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the practical dimensions and 
limitations of sovereignty and autonomy with respect to Tribal Nations.1  Due 
to the expansion of Indigenous academic scholarship in the past few 
decades, Indigenous theorists have struggled with the meaning and purpose 
of sovereignty as a political objective.  More recently, autonomy has emerged 
in the struggle.  Initially, sovereignty and autonomy appear to share strong 
conceptual connections that are useful to Tribal Nations.  This thesis 
evaluates these connections and assesses their limitations through an 
                                                            
1  This thesis does not use Indian, American Indian, or Native American unless citing 
material in Federal “Indian” law and policy or other supporting materials.  Tribal Nations and 
Indigenous Peoples or tribal and Indigenous, are used interchangeably.  The purpose for 
using Tribal Nations is two-fold.  First, The American Heritage College Dictionary defines 
tribal as relating to tribe in the first sense as:  A unit of social organization consisting of a 
number of groups who share a common ancestry, culture, and leadership.  Second, as 
anthropologist Ronald Niezen points out in The Origins of Indigenism:  Human Rights and the 
Politics of Identity (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:  University of California Press, 2003) we 
are “inclined to see indigenous peoples as ‘nations’ by virtue of the fact that their 
representatives are presenting their arguments in international forums” (213) based on “the 
conviction that the nature and purpose of the family, tribe, or regional bloc can only be 
realized in the nation” (200). 
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examination of four schools of thought in Tribal Nations’ sovereignty 
literature.2   
The most common line of thought to appear in Tribal Nations’ 
sovereignty literature is what this thesis refers to as the re-conceptualist, 
which seeks to re-conceptualize and expand the concept of sovereignty to 
match the cultural orientations of Tribal Nations.  The second line of thought, 
referred to as the rejectionist, stresses that sovereignty is an inappropriate 
concept for Tribal Nations, and should be abandoned and substituted by 
autonomy.  Combining these two thoughts is the rejectionist-conceptualist, 
which argues for the rejection of the political feature of sovereignty until 
cultural features of sovereignty are legitimized.  Finally, indicating a departure 
from thoughts on sovereignty is the revolutionary-conceptualist that ignores 
sovereignty and stresses an entirely revolutionary liberation from colonialism.    
To explore the dimensions and limitations of sovereignty and 
autonomy, this thesis discusses the work of a selection of Indigenous political 
theorists.  Indigenous scholars falling into the re-conceptualist thought are the 
Lakota scholar Vine Deloria, Jr. and Seneca tribal member and Professor of 
                                                            
2  These theorists were chosen because they make references to autonomy without 
providing a clear definition of the concept.  Political autonomy is understood as self-
government; yet these theorists are critical of self-government.  These theorists also make 
references to a cultural sense of autonomy.  However, as the revolutionary-conceptualist 
thought puts forth, strictly cultural objectives fail to provide liberation from the conflicts that 
the theorists have with self-government. 
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Law at the University of Syracuse Robert Odawi Porter.3  The Indigenous 
scholar falling into the rejectionist thought is furthermost represented by the 
Kahnawake Mohawk Director of the Indigenous Governance Program at the 
University of Victoria: Taiaiake Alfred.  Arguing the rejectionist-conceptualist 
thought are co-authors Comanche Chairman Wallace Coffey and Yaqui 
Professor of Law Rebecca Tsosie. Arguing from the revolutionary-
conceptualist thought is Métis scholar and activist Howard Adams.   
This thesis is divided into four chapters. To understand the U.S. 
government’s manipulation and subsequent erosion of tribal sovereignty, 
Chapter 1 reviews the colonization history of Tribal Nations and federal 
policies designed to obtain tribal land and assimilate Tribal Nations. 4  Chapter 
                                                            
3  For additional in-depth analysis of the various forms of re-conceptualist thought on 
sovereignty that have emerged as  intellectual, visual, and rhetorical sovereignty, see 
Michelle Raheja, Reading Nanook’s Smile:  Visual Sovereignty, Indigenous Revisions of 
Ethnography, and Atanarjuat (The Fast Runner),” American Quarterly 59, no. 4, (2007): 1159 
– 1185.  This piece of work is one of numerous to explore modern mediums, such as 
narrative works and film, through which Indigenous Peoples are re-conceptualizing the 
meaning and purpose of sovereignty.  See also Amanda J. Cobb, “Understanding Tribal 
Sovereignty:  Definitions, Conceptualizations, and Interpretations,” Indigeneity at the 
Crossroads of American Studies; Indigenous Studies Today:  An International Journal 2005-
2006/ American Studies: Incorporating American Studies International, 46, no. 3-4 (2005): 
115 – 132.  Also see Joanne Barker, ed., Sovereignty Matters:  Locations and Contestation 
and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination (Lincoln and London:  
University of Nebraska Press, 2005).  
4  For a review of the political and legal history of the tribal-federal relationship, see: 
Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law, Edited by David E. Wilkins (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), David H. Getches, Charles F. Wilkinson, and Robert A. 
Williams Jr., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law (5th ed. Minnesota, Thomson & 
West, 2005) and Stephan L. Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes:  The Basic ACLU 
Guide to Indian and Tribal Rights (Carbondale and Edwardsville:  Southern Illinois University 
Press, 1992).  
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2 considers the history of sovereignty and autonomy as the terms have 
developed through European philosophy, political theory, and contemporary 
international use.5   To aid in understanding sovereignty, this thesis relies on 
the work of Professor of Law Robert Williams.  This chapter also provides a 
brief overview of the development of sovereignty from the European 
Enlightenment period to contemporary thought, as explained by leading 
scholar Stephan Krasner.  To aid in understanding autonomy, this thesis uses 
the work of Professor of International Law Hurst Hannum, Professor of Public 
Law, Yash P. Ghai, and international law scholar Natalia Loukacheva.   
Chapter 3 examines how Indigenous scholars have discussed and 
applied the concepts of sovereignty to Tribal Nations.  The last section of the 
chapter analyzes the feasibility of Tribal Nations undertaking autonomy as a 
political objective.  Chapter 4 concludes with a brief summary of the major 
                                                            
5  Sovereignty is not an entitlement of international law; it is however a constitutional 
component of nation-states and their right to recognize sovereigns in international and 
domestic matters.  Tribal Nations seek to enforce the recognition of sovereignty in recent 
international developments regarding self-determination, found in United Nations documents 
on human and Indigenous rights:  namely, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, United Nations Charter Article 55, the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) common Article 1, and International Labor Organization Convention No. 169 
(1989).  Autonomy, similar to sovereignty, is not an entitlement of international law; it too is a 
constitutional component or statute, predominantly used by ethnic minorities.  The only 
international documents in which autonomy appears are explicitly linked to the administration 
of local affairs while a political authority retains the control of common interests:  Document of 
the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation Article 35 paragraph 2 and Article 4 of the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.   
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findings in chapter 3 and recommendations based on Adams’ thoughts on the 
political liberation of Tribal Nations from colonialism.  
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Chapter I 
Colonialism, Settler Governments, and Tribal Nations  
 
This chapter provides a brief overview of government mechanisms 
used to maintain the oppression of Tribal Nations’, beginning with the 
formation of the U.S. to underlying assimilation strategies in 20th century 
federal government policies.1  This chapter emphasizes how the U.S. 
government manipulated tribal sovereignty through federal policy and U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions for the purpose of colonizing, dominating, and 
controlling Tribal Nations.  The significance of federal policies and U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions during this era introduces the importance of 
defining the dimensions and limitations of sovereignty and autonomy in 
chapter 3 as political objectives for Tribal Nations. 
 
 
                                                            
1 This chapter is brief in its emphasis on the legal mechanisms leading to current Tribal 
Nations structures.  The entire history of imperialism and colonialism in Canadian and U.S. 
law would expand the limits of this paper.  However, in A Tortured People (Penticton, B.C.: 
Theyton Books, 1995) and Prison of Grass (Saskatoon, Saskatchewan:  Fifth House 
Publishers, 1989), Adams defines imperialism as an ideology stemming from capitalism or 
European economic interests in the conquest and colonization of Indigenous lands.  Adams 
defined ideology in A Tortured People as a system of ideas and political values.  Adams 
believes that the ideology of settler governments is based on capitalism and that their sole 
purpose is to indoctrinate people into this ideology.  Adams refers to colonialism as the result 
of a declining imperialism after colonization and therefore residue of imperialism carried into 
capitalist interests of the settler government to maintain political domination over Indigenous 
Peoples and Tribal Nations. 
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The Formative Years (1789 – 1871) 
When the United States was first established, Tribes were politically 
and militarily powerful and recognized as sovereigns through the treaty-
making process.  However, the terms under which Tribal Nations would be 
recognized shifted as the federal government ended treaty-making in 1871 
and initiated the erosion of tribal sovereignty. A great tragedy that shaped 
U.S. history and challenged the definitions of Tribal Nations occurred with the 
decisions in the Cherokee law cases of the 1800s, known as the Marshall 
Trilogy.  The Marshall Trilogy was a body of court decisions that set in motion 
congressional right to define the sovereign status of Tribal Nations.  
Additionally, the Marshall Trilogy continues to play an important role in the 
conceptualization of tribal sovereignty. 
Chief Justice John Marshall determined in Johnson v. Mcintosh2 that 
the US acquired title to Tribal land by way of British relinquishment of their 
“discovery” right after the Revolutionary war.  Marshall applied the 
international colonial law of “doctrine of discovery” to claim that the U.S. 
became sole heir of the right to colonize and dominate tribal lands.  The 
“doctrine” was colonial by the nature that it protected the economic interest 
that a European country found in new land from being claimed by another 
colonizing European country.    
                                                            
2 Johnson v McIntosh 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) 
 
8 
 
Marshall ruled in Cherokee Nation v Georgia3 that Tribal Nations were 
considered to hold limited rights to occupy their land which would therefore be 
classified as “domestic dependent nations” under the pupilage of the U.S. 
government.  Much of Marshall’s perspective on land occupation was linked 
to European philosopher John Locke where he outlined “user rights” as 
opposed to “property rights.”  Because Tribal Nations showed more rotation in 
their land operations as a method to preserve the environment, European 
Enlightenment thinkers argued that Tribal Nations had not developed effective 
property holdings to protect individual property rights and ownership.  
In Worcestor v. Georgia4 Marshall entrusted to the federal government 
the approval of all economic policies between states and Tribal Nations. This 
case defined more clearly the interpretation of tribal sovereignty.  Marshall 
ruled that Tribal Nations were restricted from entering foreign relations, 
alienating their land except to the federal government, and were bound to a 
larger and more powerful sovereign in terms of national protection, trade 
regulation, and ultimate governing authority. 
The Removal Act of 1830 was passed by the U.S. Congress and 
signed into law by President Andrew Jackson.  The Removal Act further 
eroded tribal sovereignty as the federal government removed and relocated 
the majority of eastern Tribes west of the Mississippi River in lands occupied 
                                                            
3 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) 
 
4 Worcester v Georgia 31 U.S. 483 (1832) 
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by other tribes, but not by settlers.  As the settlers encroached on lands 
further west, the Tribal Nations of the plains retaliated, resulting in hostilities, 
military campaigns, and wars.  By 1913, the last Indian war had ended and 
the federal government had forced tribes onto reservations.  The Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA), created in 1824, now controlled all reservation lands, held 
in trust status by the U.S. government.5   
 
The Era of Allotment and Assimilation (1871 – 1928) 
This next era settled for a more direct policy toward Tribal Nations:  
assimilation, carried out largely by the Dawes Act 1887 or the General 
Allotment Act.6  To accomplish this, Congress decided to divide up 
communally held tribal lands into separate parcels, give each tribal member a 
parcel, and sell “surplus” parcels to white settlers.7  As political scientist 
Sharon O’Brien puts forth in American Indian Tribal Governments, there were 
two significant features of the General Allotment Act.  O’Brien writes: 
First, the notion of private ownership seriously conflicted with the 
deeply held tribal belief that land was a sacred resource to be used 
communally.  Second, while many eastern tribes were traditionally 
agriculturalists and could indeed take credit for teaching farming 
                                                            
5  Although some east coast Tribal Nations, such as the Mashpee, Poosepatuck, and 
the Pequot, were forced to retreat to reservations as early as the late 1600s, reservations 
came to the fore in this era.   
6 General Allotment Act 25 U.S.C. (1887) 
 
7 Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, 5. 
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techniques and introducing new crops to the first settlers, farming 
represented a completely alien way of life for most western tribes.8 
 
Most Indians did not want to abandon their communal society and adopt the 
way of life of a farmer.9  Further, the land that was reserved and/or allotted 
was often unsuitable for farming.  Thousands of impoverished Indians sold 
their land or lost their land in foreclosures when they were unable to pay state 
real estate taxes.10  
 
Reorganization Era (1928 – 1945) 
After decades of disastrous results from the Removal and Allotment 
Acts, the U.S. government shifted policy with the Indian Reorganization Act 
(IRA) of 1934.11  The IRA halted further allotments of Indian lands and 
established tribal governments and courts.12  Although initiated as recognizing 
a greater sense of self-government for Tribal Nations, the BIA constructed 
boiler-plate tribal constitutions including internal references to U.S. authority 
                                                            
8 Sharon O’Brien, American Indian Tribal Governments (Norman and London: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1993), 78. 
 
9 Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, 5. 
 
10 Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, 5. 
 
11 Indian Reorganization Act 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1934) 
 
12 Sharon O’Brien, “Federal Indian Policies and the International Protection of Human 
Rights,” Edited by Vine Deloria, Jr., American Indian Policy in the Twentieth Century 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 43. 
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over tribal actions.  IRA constitutions pressured Tribal Nations to act as 
federally chartered corporations rather than distinctly self-governing nations 
acting under respective sovereign interests.13   
 
The Termination Era (1945 – 1961) 
During the 1950s, Congress made another abrupt change in policy, 
abandoning the goals of the Indian Reorganization Act and ending its efforts 
to improve Indian economic life.14  This change in policy is known as the 
termination era.  In Federal Indian Law, Cohen writes, “In a narrow sense, 
termination was an experiment imposed on a small number of Tribes that 
ended, in virtually all respects, the special relationship between those Tribes 
and the federal government.15   
  Congress and the BIA worked together to collect comprehensive data 
on the social and economic status of every Indian group or Tribe under 
federal supervision.16  According to Cohen, “[t]his quantifiable information was 
to be used in projecting policies aimed at the eventual discharge of the 
federal government’s obligation – legal and moral – and the discontinuance of 
                                                            
13 See Felix S. Cohen On the Drafting of Tribal Constitutions, Edited by David E. Wilkins 
(Norman:  University of Oklahoma Press, 2006). 
 
14 Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, 7. 
 
15 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 91. 
 
16 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 91. 
 
12 
 
federal supervision and control at the earliest possible date compatible with 
the government’s trusteeship responsibility.”17   
In exchange for the termination of tribal specific federal services, tribal 
assets were sold and divided between tribal members. During this era, many 
tribal members were relocated to urban work programs.  The distance created 
by yet another relocation experience for many of these tribes, produced 
psychological problems that further affected their socio-economic status, 
sense of self worth, and attitudes toward federal policy. 
 
Self-Determination Era (1961 – Present) 
The federal government began to abandon the termination policy in 
1958.18  There are three central reasons for this, numerous Tribal members 
were arguing for a release from disastrous federal policies, the 
impoverishment resulting from the termination policy did not fit with newer 
developing policies to battle poverty in the U.S, and Termination also proved 
more expensive for the federal government.  In response, the federal 
government inaugurated policies of self-determination and self-governance in 
the early 1970s in order to recognize the distinctive cultural, political, and 
                                                            
17 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 91. 
 
18 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 97. 
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economic rights of Tribal Nations and to encourage greater political 
independence of Tribes.19   
According to Cohen, “The foundation policies of self-determination and 
self-governance were articulated in speeches delivered by President Lyndon 
Johnson and later, President Richard Nixon.20  At the onset of this era, 
President Johnson declared that new policies toward Tribal Nations should 
strengthen their sense of “autonomy” without threatening their sense of 
community and the responsibility of the federal government 21  As enunciated 
by President Nixon, the policy of self-determination rejects the two extreme 
policies advocated at various times in the U.S. nation's history:  termination of 
the special relationship on the one hand and an excessive dependence on 
the federal government on the other.22  With President Nixon, autonomy 
entered the discussion of tribal sovereignty.  However, President Nixon did 
not define autonomy as a policy for tribes.   
                                                            
19 David Wilkins and K. Tsianina Lomawaima, Uneven Ground: American Indian Sovereignty 
and Federal Law (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 7. 
 
20 Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 100. 
 
21 Nixon, Richard M. “Recommendations for Indian Policy,” Washington, D.C.:  Government 
Printing Office, 1970.  John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters,The American Presidency 
Project. (Santa Barbara, CA: University of California). 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2573. (accessed April 14, 2008). 
22 Senate Committee on Indian Affairs Briefing Booklet, The Enduring Validity of Indian Self-
Determination. (January 11, 1999). http://www.senate.gov/~scia/106brfs/selfd.htm (accessed 
April 14, 2008). 
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The two major acts in tribal self-governance policy have been the 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 197523 and the 
Tribal Self-Governance Act of 1994.24  The Indian Self-Determination and 
Education Assistance Act established procedures allowing Tribal Nations to 
administer more directly health and education services.  The Tribal Self-
Governance Act developed out of subsequent grievances with the Self-
Determination Act, specifically as Tribal Nations demanded more control to 
administer federal funding.   
In sum, as this brief history of the Tribal Nations’ interaction with the 
U.S. federal government reveals, tribal sovereignty is largely dependent upon 
and subject to federal recognition.  In terms of tribal sovereignty, Deloria 
believes, “[t]he issue boils down to making another political entity respect your 
rights deriving from a contractual agreement you have with them.”25  As Glen 
Coulthard summarized the relationship in Indigenous Peoples and the Politics 
of Recognition, “terms of recognition tend to remain the property of those in 
power to grant to their inferiors in ways that they deem appropriate.”26    
                                                            
23 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 25 U.S.C. § 450 et seq. (1975) 
 
24 Tribal Self-Governance Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §458 Part D  
 
25 Vine Deloria, Jr., “Intellectual Self-Determination and Sovereignty:  Looking at the Windmill 
in our Minds,” Wicazo Sa Review 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 26. 
 
26 Glen Coulthard, “Indigenous Peoples and the Politics of Recognition,” New Socialist: Ideas 
for Radical Change, Sept. - Oct., 2006, 119 – 12. 
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As this chapter has indicated, the U.S. government has manipulated 
the concept of tribal sovereignty through a variety of policies, laws, and legal 
decisions.  Tribal Nations retain inherent, yet limited sovereignty.  Policies of 
sovereignty are evidence that Tribal Nations, “more than any other ethnic 
group, are subject to extensive legal regulation of their rights.”27   It is 
therefore, understandable why many theorists such as Deloria, Porter, Alfred, 
Coffey and Tsosie discuss the validity of sovereignty, its proper definition, and 
application.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
27 Getches, Wilkinson, Williams, Jr., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law, 1. 
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CHAPTER II 
Origins and Common Applications of Sovereignty and 
Autonomy 
 
As Tribal Nations struggle with the meaning and purpose of a limited 
sovereignty, it is necessary to understand the origins of the concept of 
sovereignty, and that of autonomy.  The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
the historical development and current understanding of sovereignty and 
autonomy generally.  How Indigenous theorists have defined these terms is 
evaluated in the next chapter. 
 
Sovereignty 
Robert Williams, Lumbee tribal member and Director of the Indigenous 
Peoples Law and Policy Program at the University of Arizona has traced the 
origin and development of sovereignty in The American Indian in Western 
Legal Thought.1  According to Williams’ well-documented history, Europeans, 
in the 13th century, appropriated the concept of sovereignty as absolute 
authority from ancient Asian empires.  Initially, European rulers used the 
concept of sovereignty to endorse religious wars against non-believers of 
Christianity. 
                                                            
1 See Robert Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of 
Conquest (New York, Oxford:  Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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Political philosopher Jean Bodin (1530-1596) defined sovereignty as a 
purely political concept.  Bodin used the concept of sovereignty to settle the 
question of how the state must be organized for the sake of order.  Order, 
Bodin argued, flowed from recognition of the territorial state as personified in 
the divine monarch, whose duty it was to protect trade, territorial security, and 
national integrity. 
After Bodin, various philosophers developed and located sovereignty in 
the personality of the people, not the monarch.  A great portion of this 
development took place during the European Enlightenment era, namely from 
the work of social contract theorists, such as Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), 
John Locke (1632-1703), and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778).2  The 
social contract theorists were disinterested in the concept of sovereignty 
serving as an absolute right of state answerable to a divine monarch.  By 
placing sovereignty in “the people,” they could withdraw their allegiance from 
a ruler. 
According to the social contract theorists, sovereign rule contained 
within its foundational machinery “popular sovereignty” based on natural law.  
Rousseau, speaking of sovereignty’s “double capacity”, argued that, “as a 
member of the Sovereign he is bound to the individuals, and as a member of 
                                                            
2 See Christopher W. Morris, ed., The Social Contract Theorists (Lanham, Boulder, New 
York, and Oxford:  Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999). 
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the State to the Sovereign.”3   With the migration of sovereignty from the ruler 
to the people, the notion of popular sovereignty, or the democratic ideal 
materialized:  that a state and government concede to the will of the people 
and the people to the will of the state.  This ideal, understood and practiced 
by certain Indigenous tribes, such as the Iroquois, formed the philosophical 
rationale for the 1776 American Revolution.  
As a concept, sovereignty can be used to expand or decrease power.  
Europeans, after using sovereignty to solidify their own authority, 
subsequently manipulated the application of the concept to colonize 
Indigenous Peoples, minority communities, and entire states.  By the start of 
WWII, Western powers exercised sovereignty over four-fifths of the world.   
Today, nation-states provide the status quo for sovereignty.  To 
understand nation-state sovereignty, the concept must be understood on a 
global scale.  Globalization has led to stronger regionalism (European Union, 
African Charters, OAS, Latin America, etc.) and border conflicts, trade 
agreements, and international recognition.  Such authors as Stephen Krasner 
argue that globalization has overshadowed or evicted sovereignty from its 
former recognition as a preeminent political concept.  Krasner believes that 
                                                            
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. by George Douglas 
Howard Cole 
http://ia311535.us.archive.org/1/items/therepublicofpla00rousouft/therepublicofpla00rousouft_
djvu.txt. (accessed April 14, 2008). 
 
 
19 
 
sovereignty remains an “attractive” feature for providing little more than 
international recognition; “that recognition guarantees access to international 
organizations and sometimes to international finance.”4   
In Sovereignty, Krasner argues that the concept has been used four 
different ways:  1) international legal sovereignty, referring to mutual 
recognition between political entities retaining some form of jurisdiction; 2) 
Westphalian sovereignty, referring to internal control of a political organization 
without exception from external authority structures; 3) domestic sovereignty, 
referring to state political authority free from external authority structures; and 
4) interdependence sovereignty, referring to the ability of public authorities to 
regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital 
across the borders of their state.5  These forms of sovereignty may or may not 
occur simultaneously.  Krasner believes at any given time a political entity 
may retain all or some features, of these uses of sovereignty.  Though 
Krasner’s uses of sovereignty might explain the limitations of sovereignty due 
to globalization, each use carries special significance for the assertion of tribal 
sovereignty.   
International legal sovereignty should be expressed by the U.S. in the 
mutual recognition and respect of tribal sovereignty.  As mutual recognition 
moves through the Westphalian and domestic uses, tribal sovereignty has 
                                                            
4  Stephan Krasner, "Think Again:  Sovereignty," Foreign Policy, (Jan - Feb. 2001): 20.  
 
5 Stephan Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1999): 3 – 4. 
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clearly been manipulated and therefore never appropriately respected by the 
U.S.  In terms of interdependence and the ability to regulate the flow of such 
things as pollutants through tribal land, this form of sovereignty is largely 
compromised if states fail to respect interdependence.   
 International issues with sovereignty reveal that nation-states are 
forced to accept that the political and economic world is ever more critically 
integrated and that central decisions have regional and international 
consequences.  It would be expected that the U.S. would take this evidence 
in further consideration of respecting the sovereignty of Tribal Nations.  As 
this has not happened, it is understandable why an Indigenous theorist may 
reject sovereignty and propose autonomy as an attractive political objective.   
 
Autonomy 
The concept of autonomy is a more ancient concept than that of 
sovereignty.  The term autonomy derives from the Greek auto (self) and 
nomos (rule of law) and has many synonyms in modern political, sociological, 
philosophical, and juridical literature.6  The issue of autonomy is increasingly 
important owing to the majority of wars today are groups fighting for increased 
independence and/or control over their lives, lands, and resources.  The 
                                                            
6 Natalia Loukacheva, working paper On Autonomy and Law, at Globalization and Autonomy 
Online Compendium, 3. 
http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/article.jsp?index=RA_Loukacheva_AutonomyLaw.xml, 
(accessed April 14, 2008). 
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majority of these groups are ethnic minorities residing in and seeking self-
government in a multi-ethnic state.  
As chapter 1 discussed, Tribal Nations share a unique and critically 
integrated relationship of colonialism with the U.S. government.  As inherent 
sovereigns, Tribal Nations possess a status that many ethnic minorities do 
not possess.  Ethnic groups may or may not have prior occupancy rights to 
land and therefore do not retain inherent sovereignty.  
To better understand the political variations on autonomy, the 
philosophical origins of the concept must first be understood.  In The 
Perversions of Autonomy, Hasting Center scholars’ Willard Gaylin and Bruce 
Jennings maintain that “[to] grasp what animates the contemporary idea of 
autonomy, it is important to locate it against the background of the modern 
worldview that developed in European civilization from roughly the sixteenth 
century on.”7  During this time, European Enlightenment philosopher 
Immanuel Kant (1724 –1804) responded to the religious influence of pre-
Enlightenment with autonomy.  Breaking from the religious passion of the pre-
Enlightenment era, Kant believed that individuals did not need to believe in a 
higher authority for a secure society.8  Kant determined that autonomy is the 
                                                            
7 Willard Gaylin and Bruce Jennings, The Perversion of Autonomy: Coercion and Constraints 
in a Liberal Society (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2003): 29. 
 
8  At this juncture it is worth noting that Kantian autonomy rejects spirituality in its 
foundational machinery.  Such a concept would be misplaced for Tribal Nations considering 
there is a spiritual as well as ethical balance key to the tribal worldview.    
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fundamental feature of the categorical imperative, or as used in this thesis:  
internal control without exception.9  Kantian autonomy is an explicit moral 
obligation to respect individual personality.   
Kantian autonomy, in terms of a political objective is similar to 
Rousseau’s double capacity in sovereignty.  Personal and political autonomy 
is in some real sense the right to be different and to be left alone; to preserve, 
protect, and promote values which are beyond the legitimate reach of the rest 
of society.10  Therefore, as the double capacity of sovereignty entails a sense 
of shared and participatory control of governance, autonomy as a political 
objective suggests that a political authority is obligated to respect a separate 
political group without interference.  Thus, sovereignty and autonomy are 
similar as the autonomous region must still respect the larger society, as in 
working in a cooperative environment. 
Scholars examining and evaluating the efficacy of autonomy as a 
political status include Hannum, Ghai, and Loukacheva.  Hannum and Lillich 
(1933 – 1996) in The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, which 
appeared in the prestigious American Journal of International law, define 
autonomy as: 
                                                            
9 See Immanuel Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals: Transition from 
Popular Moral Philosophy to the Metaphysic of Morals, trans., Thomas Kingsmill Abbot1785. 
http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/etext04/ikfpm10.txt (accessed April 4, 2008). 
 
10 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 4. 
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Independence of action on the internal or domestic level, as foreign 
affairs and defense normally are in the hands of the central or national 
government, but occasionally power to conclude international 
agreements concerning cultural or economic matters also may reside 
with the autonomous entity.11  
 
Ghai, editor of Autonomy and Ethnicity, defines autonomy as a device to 
allow ethnic or other groups claiming a distinct identity to exercise direct 
control over affairs of special concern to them, while allowing the larger entity 
those powers which cover common interests.12  Ghai also puts forth, 
“[a]utonomy becomes less problematic if it can be disassociated from 
sovereignty.”13   
As Tribal Nations retain inherent sovereignty, it may be difficult to 
consider an autonomy arrangement for Tribal Nations as both they and the 
U.S. government each have desired strong central authority over tribal affairs.  
By this line of reasoning, arrangements for autonomy may or may not be 
strengthened by the indeterminacy of sovereigns to agree on a standard set 
of limitations between local administration and central political authority.  As 
Tribal Nations have experienced, the U.S. is likely to retain the central 
authority to suspend, by Congressional “plenary power”, strong central 
authority of tribal governments. 
                                                            
11 Hurst Hannum and Robert Lillich, “The Concept of Autonomy in International Law,” The 
American Journal of International Law 74, no. 4, (1980): 860. 
 
12 Yash P. Ghai, ed., Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Ethnic-States  
(Singapore: Green Giant Press, 2000), 8. 
 
13 Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity, 16. 
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An important note must be made on the definitions of autonomy 
provided by Hannum, Lillich and Ghai:  autonomy refers to local control over 
special concerns while a central authority controls common interests, foreign 
affairs, and national defense.  Further, Ghai determines that direct control 
over internal affairs with a central identity controlling common affairs often 
entails an asymmetry in constitutional provisions.14  For instance, it may be 
difficult to manage various autonomous arrangements or regions, all of which 
seeking identical treatment from a central authority, if there is conflicting 
domestic and international laws, policies, and constitutions.  
Based on Hannum, Lillich, and Ghai’s, definitions, there are strong 
connections between autonomy as it is understood for ethnic minorities and 
tribal sovereignty.  The U.S., a central authority, controls common interests, 
foreign affairs, and national defense while Tribal Nations struggle to control 
local affairs under federal policy.  Similarly, the U.S. government has 
continued to deprive tribes of their autonomous or internal, or sovereign 
powers to control their own affairs. 
Hannum listed in his later work Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-
Determination a set of variables that, if they exist, provide the content for an 
autonomous political existence:  1) language, 2) education, 3) access to 
                                                            
14 Ghai, Autonomy and Ethnicity, 11 – 14.  Asymmetry in constitutional provisions, or 
conflicting perspectives on various federal, tribal, administrative, and environmental policies, 
has largely dominated tribal sovereignty. 
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government civil service employment and social services, 4) land and natural 
resources, and 5) representative local government structures.15  Language is 
perhaps the most distinctive feature of a culture.16  Hannum notes that the 
experience of a spoken national language being withheld from a cultural and 
national minority is a direct violation of the cooperative role of a nation-state 
and sovereign partners internal to that nation-state.  Hannum’s findings on 
this matter correlate with the experiences of languages being denied to tribal 
individuals in the boarding school experiences of the assimilation era in 
federal policy, a direct attack on the autonomy or sovereignty of Tribal 
Nations.  However, many Tribal Nations have managed to retain their 
languages and most importantly, have institutionalized tribal language in 
developments postdating the Termination era.       
Education is, along with language, the primary vehicle through which a 
culture is transmitted.17  Though individual states are obligated to provide 
education on a universal basis, states are also obligated to allow local control 
over content.  In terms of tribal sovereignty and autonomy, Tribal Nations 
possess the inherent right and authority to create academic and educational 
programs and institutions. 
                                                            
15 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 458. 
 
16 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 458. 
 
17 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 462. 
 
26 
 
Based on Hannum’s study, access to government civil service 
employment and social services rests largely upon ethnic divisions that can 
be extended and enforced when administrative policies and duties are 
withheld from an aspiring community.  Due to policies of the Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act and Self-Governance Act, Tribal 
Nations possess a greater amount of control over internal administrative 
duties.  However, Indigenous theorists have begun to explore the existence of 
neo-colonialism in tribal self-government following these policies.18  
In Hannum’s terms of land and natural resources, “[l]and is the literal 
and figurative foundation of the state and of every community that aspires to 
political autonomy.19  Land is the symbolic aspect of controlling one’s 
‘homeland’ under principles separate from a centralized government. 20  An 
important piece of tribal sovereignty is the full return of tribal jurisdiction over 
Tribal land.   
Hannum believes that fully autonomous territory possesses 
representative local government structures involving 1) local control or 
influence over education, use of language, structure of local government, and 
                                                            
18  Neo-colonialism is the control of Indigenous affairs which occurs through the 
employment of Indigenous Peoples in colonized institutions.  Here the most effective 
colonizer is the colonized who accepts the state ideology of capitalism; providing the 
colonizer with the social control, land, natural resources, and labor to extend and enforce 
dependency upon the colonizer’s economy.   
 
19 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 463.  
 
20 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 463. 
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land use and planning, 2) a locally selected chief executive, who may be 
subject to approval by the central government, 3) an independent local 
judiciary with full responsibility for interpreting local laws, and 4) areas of joint 
concern which may be the subject of power-sharing arrangements between 
the autonomous and central governments.21  Based on Hannums’ 
delineations, Tribal Nations may possess autonomy to some degree; perhaps 
just short of full sovereignty.  At this juncture, autonomy significantly 
resembles local administration or self-governance.   
In the working paper On Autonomy and Law, Loukacheva “employs the 
concept of autonomy as equivalent to self-government pursuant to 
international law, comparative constitutional law, and Indigenous Peoples 
political conditions.22  Loukacheva argues that there are weak grounds for 
autonomy as a principle of international law and somewhat stronger, but still 
very limited, grounds for its recognition in comparative law.23  Loukacheva 
also argues that autonomy may serve as a dynamic concept for Indigenous 
Peoples.   
According to Loukacheva, the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting 
of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on Security 
                                                            
21 Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 467. 
 
22 Loukacheva, On Autonomy and Law, 1–2. 
 
23 Loukacheva, On Autonomy and Law, 1. 
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and Cooperation Article 35 paragraph 2 refers to autonomy as an option of 
administration for minorities under a participating state: 
The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and 
create conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of 
the possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or 
autonomous administrations corresponding to the specific historical 
and territorial circumstances of such minorities and in accordance with 
the policies of the State concerned. 
 
 
As the previous document states, autonomy is recognized as equivalent to 
local administration.  It also has an explicit reference of local administration 
corresponding not only to the characteristics of a minority but that of the 
policies of the state.  This reference to local administration in correspondence 
with state authority may not be useful to Tribal Nations as the U.S has 
previously proven to create conditions opposite of those in this document.   
At the time of Loukacheva’s major investigations, the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was not yet adopted.  At the time, Article 
31 stated: 
Indigenous Peoples, as a specific form of exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs… 
 
This reference to autonomy, which survived numerous amendments, is now 
located only in Article 4: 
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Indigenous Peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have 
the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions. 
 
 
Autonomy and self-government are indicated with the disjunctive “or”, which 
makes these notions synonymous.24   Self-government is a critical issue for 
Tribal Nations.  Therefore, it is necessary to review their perspectives on 
sovereignty, autonomy, and self-government in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
24 Loukacheva, On Autonomy and Law, 14. 
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Chapter III 
Indigenous Theorists and a Critical Analysis of Autonomy as 
Political Objective 
  
Innovative theories and expansion of the concept of sovereignty 
continues to be a critical point of discussion by various Indigenous theorists.  
The underlying question in this discussion is whether sovereignty remains a 
useful political objective for Tribal Nations.  To examine this question, this 
chapter is separated into two sections:  section one evaluates the following 
four lines of thought: re-conceptualist, rejectionist, rejection-conceptualist, and 
the revolutionary-conceptualist.  Section two evaluates the logic of autonomy 
as a political objective for Tribal Nations, concluding with recommendations 
following the revolutionary-conceptualist perspective.   
Each school of thought accepts that Tribal nation-building must take 
place within the local tribal community; they differ however on what the use of 
sovereignty implies for this objective.  For instance, the re-conceptualists 
argue that sovereignty can provide the necessary psychological and political 
incentive for re-building Tribal Nations; the rejectionist argues that the 
sovereignty diminishes the cultural orientation of Tribal Nations and should 
therefore be abandoned.  The rejection-conceptualists argue that cultural 
feature of sovereignty must be expanded before political feature has any 
meaning or use, and the revolutionary-conceptualist ignores sovereignty and 
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argues for features of nation-building that lead from colonialism to liberation.  
The following chart provides a summary of each school of thought and each 
indigenous scholar’s interpretation of sovereignty.1  
 
INDIGENOUS THEORETICAL THOUGHT ON SOVEREIGNTY 
THEORIST SCHOOL OF 
THOUGHT 
PRIMARY CHARACTARISTICS 
DELORIA Re-
Conceptualist 
 Council of elders oversees internal 
activities 
 Tribal council enters political 
discourse with nation-states 
 European concept of property 
rights useful to protect land 
PORTER   Tribal members must have belief  
 Carry out that belief 
 All must recognize that belief 
ALFRED Rejectionist  Rejection of sovereignty  
 Revitalization of Tribal values 
 Nations respect other nation’s 
autonomy 
COFFEY & 
TSOSIE 
Rejection-
Conceptualist 
 Tribes look within for core 
meaning 
 External political sovereignty 
paused until internal or “cultural” 
sovereignty is realized 
ADAMS Revolutionary
-Conceptualist
 Ignores sovereignty  
 “Cultural” nationalism is step 
backward 
 Complete liberation from state 
ideology of capitalism 
 
 
                                                            
1  This category of Indigenous theorists was devised in this thesis to represent the 
collective thought on sovereignty in respect to Tribal Nations. 
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Section I 
The Re-Conceptualists, Rejectionist, Rejectionist-Conceptualists, and 
Revolutionary-Conceptualist Schools of Thought 
 
In the keynote address at the May 26, 1995 Tribal Sovereignty Forum 
of the American Indian Policy Center, Deloria explained what this thesis refers 
to as the re-conceptualist  thought on sovereignty.2  This approach focuses 
on three aspects of sovereign authority:  external, internal, and property 
rights.  External sovereignty is dependent upon tribal nationhood as a basis in 
which tribal councils enter political discourses with other nation-states.  
According to Deloria, nationhood implies a process of decision-making that is 
free and uninhibited within a community that is virtually insulated from 
external factors as it considers its possible options.3  In contrast to 
nationhood, understood as full external sovereignty, self-government implies 
that a superior political power monitors the local decision making authority to 
ensure that its decisions and outcomes are compatible with the goals and 
policies of the larger political power.4  
                                                            
2 Vine Deloria, Jr., “Rethinking Tribal Sovereignty” (keynote address, Tribal Sovereignty 
Forum of the American Indian Policy Center, May 26, 1995). 
http://www.airpi.org/projects/tribsov.html, (accessed April 14, 2008).  
 
3 Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Little, The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American 
Indian Sovereignty (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), 13.  
 
4 Deloria and Little, The Nations Within, 14. 
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According to Deloria, internal sovereignty can be determined by a 
council of elders that oversee the internal activities of Tribal Nations.  Also, 
external sovereignty can be determined by a tribal council that works more 
directly with other nations and nation-states.  By Deloria’s line of reasoning, 
internal sovereignty can strengthen traditional aspects of Tribal Nations as 
external sovereignty provides a space for tribes to participate in open political 
dialogue.   
Property rights are a re-conceptualist thought on sovereignty.  Deloria 
believes that although property rights are European in origin and that Tribal 
Nations held land communally rather than individually, property rights are still 
useful.  According to Deloria, embracing property rights to protect tribal land 
from non-tribal economic developers can be an expression of both internal 
and external tribal sovereignty.  
In Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform and 
The Decolonization of Indigenous Governance, Porter’s arguments also fall 
into the re-conceptualist school of thought.  Porter argues that tribal 
sovereignty depends upon the extent to which:  1) tribes believe in the right to 
define their own future, 2) possess the ability to carry out those beliefs, and 3) 
the tribe and outside world recognizes tribal sovereignty.5  Porter stresses 
                                                            
5 Robert Odawi Porter, “Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty through Government Reform:  What 
Are the Issues?” Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy 7, no.1 (1997): 90.  Robert Porter 
also stated that the three main faces of tribal dysfunction are poor administration, 
dependence, and infighting. See also Porter’s chapter “The Decolonization of Indigenous 
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foremost internal implications, that of believing that a concept of European 
origin can strengthen the future of Tribal Nations.  Believing that sovereignty 
is the power of a people to control their own destiny, Porter argues that the 
legitimacy of sovereignty lies in tribal ability to extend and enforce it.6 
Alfred’s approach, classified as rejectionist, is plainly set forth in his 
“manifesto” Peace, Power, Righteousness.  “Sovereignty,” Alfred argues, “is 
an exclusionary concept rooted in an adversarial and coercive Western notion 
of power.”7  By this line of reasoning, “sovereignty implies a set of values and 
objectives in direct opposition to those found in traditional indigenous 
philosophies.” 8  Alfred maintains that scholars and activists must reject the 
term and notion of indigenous “sovereignty.”9  If sovereignty remains the goal 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Governance” in For Indigenous Eyes Only: The Decolonization Handbook, Edited by 
Waziyatawin Angela Wilson and Michael Yellow Bird, Santa Fe:  School of American 
Research, (2005): 100.  
 
6 Porter, The Decolonization of Indigenous Governance, 100. 
 
7 Alfred, Taiaiake.  Peace, Power, Righteousness:  An Indigenous Manifesto (Canada: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 59.  The notion of power is a central feature in Alfred’s argument.   
Alfred argues that, separate from Western power which is predominantly individualistic, 
coercive, and adversarial, Indigenous power respects the intellectual, mental, physical, and 
spiritual essence of all elements of creation without interfering in their natural functions for 
personal, political, or economic self gain. 
 
8 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness. 57.  According to Alfred’s “manifesto”, Tribal Nations’ 
traditional Indigenous philosophies are: respect for the earth (xiv), a respectful way of 
governing (xvi), leadership that loves and sacrifices for people (xv), a worldview that balances 
respect for autonomy with recognition of a universal interdependency (xvi), and peaceful co-
existence among all the elements of creation (xvi).    
9 See Taiaiake Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Sovereignty Matters:  Locations of Contestation and 
Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination, ed. Joanne Barker (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 2005), 41; and A Companion to American Indian 
History, ed. Vine Deloria Jr. and Neal Salisbury, (New York: Blackwell Publishers, 2002), 460 
– 474.    
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of indigenous politics, Alfred argues, “…Native communities will occupy a 
dependent and reactionary position relative to the state.”10  Alfred’s argument 
is supported by the reality that “Congress has the authority to limit or even 
abolish tribal powers, and thus tribes are ‘limited’ sovereignties.”11   
Coffey and Tsosie’s Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 
represents a rejectionist-conceptualist approach.  In this Stanford Law Review 
article, the authors call for a reappraisal of the tribal sovereignty doctrine, one 
which looks within – to the “cultural sovereignty” of Tribal Nations – for the 
core of its meaning rather than to an externally defined notion of tribal 
“political sovereignty.”12  Similar to Alfred’s rejectionist thought, Coffey and 
Tsosie reject external political features that are restricted by federal policy 
until “cultural sovereignty” and autonomy are realized.  Similar to Deloria’s 
and Porter’s re-conceptualist thought “cultural sovereignty” is dependent upon 
the willingness of Tribal Nations to determine their own meaning of 
sovereignty.13     
                                                                                                                                                                         
 
10 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness, 59. 
11 Pevar, The Rights of Indians and Tribes, 79. 
 
12 Wallace Coffey and Rebecca Tsosie, “Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: Cultural 
Sovereignty and the Collective Future of Indian Nations.” Stanford Law and Policy Review 12, 
no. 2, (2001), 191. 
 
13 Coffey and Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 196. 
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Arguing from, what this thesis terms the revolutionary-conceptualist 
thought is Adams.  Adams does not discuss sovereignty; but does refer to a 
conceptualization of autonomy in a cultural and political sense of Indigenous 
nationalism and liberation from the capitalist ideology of the Canadian nation-
state: 
As long as capitalism remains the dominant ideology in Canada, these 
segregated Métis and Indian areas will probably have to remain 
separate and autonomous…In this case, however, separatism means 
nothing more than allowing the present segregation of reserves, 
colonies, and ghettos to continue as they are today, with the exception 
that autonomy and local control must be given to them.14 
   
To Adams, autonomy functions largely as internal control as the given reality 
of Tribal Nations’ position in the dominant nation-state.  By this line of 
reasoning, autonomy does not mark any real shift in tribal sovereignty or the 
overall state of affairs between the colonizer and the colonized.   
These Indigenous theorists discuss the features of tribal sovereignty.  
For the re-conceptualist school of thought, sovereignty is a separation of 
council authorities, an embracement of property rights, and an inner ability to 
believe.  For the rejectionist school of thought, sovereignty is an exclusionary 
concept and therefore inappropriate for Tribal Nations.  For the rejectionist-
conceptualist school of thought, sovereignty is a process of reclaiming culture 
before political advancements can be made.  For the revolutionary-
                                                            
14 Adams, Prison of Grass, 168. 
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conceptualist school of thought, sovereignty is entirely absent in a discussion 
between the colonizer and the colonized.   
The re-conceptualist, rejectionist, and rejection-conceptualist theorists 
provide an in-depth understanding of the dimensions, limitations, and hopes 
for sovereignty.  However, when referring to autonomy the rejectionist, 
rejection-conceptualist, and the revolutionary conceptualist allude to the 
concept without clearly defining how autonomy differs from self-government.  
The following section evaluates autonomy as an appropriate political objective 
for Tribal Nations.   
 
Section II 
A Critical Analysis of Autonomy as Political Objective 
 
Rejecting sovereignty, Alfred argues for autonomy in a federal system.  
To demonstrate autonomy in a federal system, Alfred explains the workings of 
the Mohawk Two-Row Wampum: 
The Kanien’kahaka Kaswentha (Mohawk Two-Row Wampum) 
principle embodies this notion of power in the context of relations 
between nations.  Instead of subjugating one to the other, the 
Kanien’kehaka who opened their territory to Dutch traders in the early 
seventeenth century negotiated an original and lasting peace based on 
co-existence or power in a context of respect for the autonomy and 
distinctive nature of each partner.  The metaphor for this relationship – 
two vessels, each possessing its own integrity, travelling the river of 
time together – was conveyed visually on a wampum belt of two 
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parallel purple lines (representing power) on a background of white 
beads (representing peace).15 
 
Alfred advises “[t]he principles embedded in cultural ideals like the Kaswentha 
are in fact consistent with some Western principles that have been nearly 
forgotten in the construction of the modern hegemonic state – among them 
the original principle of federalism.”16  Alfred also argues for pre-colonial, tribal 
confederated unions which contained principles of federalism as an 
expression of autonomy.      
Based on Hannum’s, Ghai’s and Loukacheva’s descriptions, if Tribal 
Nations embrace autonomy in a federal system, they would also embrace the 
authority of a central governing body.  A central political authority is the 
operative principle behind a federal system.  There is an internal contradiction 
with the political objective of autonomy for Tribal Nations; this lies in 
promoting principles of federalism while being critical of self-government.  
Deloria and Alfred argue that self-government is an inappropriate idea 
originating in the minds of state authorities, providing an avenue to inter-
governmental dialogue yet failing to embody the spiritual aspirations of Tribal 
Nations.17   
                                                            
15 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness, 52. 
 
16 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness, 53. 
 
17  The original statement may be found in Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Little, The 
Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty, (Austin:  University of 
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Indigenous theorists object to self-government as it is assumed that 
the tribal sovereign does not possess internal sovereignty, rather has only 
been given the authority of self-government from a higher authority, like a 
town or county.  Inherent sovereignty does not remain in such a federal 
system.  Self-government appears to be autonomy in another guise, that of 
remaining loyal to a limited internal sovereignty. 
Indigenous theorists are correct in their criticism of self-government if 
the powers of self-government that Tribal Nations possess are internal 
administrative authorities that conflict with Tribal values and keep tribes loyal 
to the overall goals and policies of the non-tribal political authority.18  As 
Adams puts forth:  The move for so-called self-government can be a 
dangerously oppressive and reactionary move.”19  Therefore, self-government 
or autonomy is like a Trojan horse for neo-colonialism, as Alfred states:  
It is ensuring continued access to Indigenous lands and resources by 
insidiously promoting a form of neo-colonial self-government in our 
communities and forcing our integration into the legal mainstream.20 
 
                                                                                                                                                                         
Texas, 1984), 15. See Alfred “Sovereignty” 2005, 42, and Alfred, Peace, Power, 
Righteousness,1999, 54. 
 
18  Recall Tribal values as described by Alfred, see note 62. 
 
19 Adams, A Tortured People, 10. 
 
20 Alfred, Peace, Power, Righteousness, xiii. 
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Forcing and integrating Tribal Nations into the legal mainstream has limited 
tribal sovereignty and self-government.  Tribal autonomy may do more to 
confuse the issue and the conceptualization of autonomy as a political 
objective than clarify it.  Deloria, Alfred, and Adams condemn the use of 
autonomy in its present manifestation as self-government.  The disagreement 
concerning autonomy hinges upon whether the Indigenous theorists conceive 
of autonomy included in or rising from inherent sovereignty.  Yet, if inherent 
sovereignty does not exist in a federal system, then autonomy is relegated to 
what Coffey and Tsosie call cultural sovereignty.   
Coffey and Tsosie refer to autonomy as an inherent right to exercise 
within tribal boundaries.21  According to Coffey and Tsosie, cultural 
sovereignty; the looking within Tribal Nations to define the future of tribal 
sovereignty, provides a context for political sovereignty rooted in autonomy.22  
Coffey and Tsosie would also appear at odds with autonomy as it has 
developed internationally; they too are critical of self-government as it 
continues to “affirm the primary role of the federal government and the 
subordinate status of Indian nations.”23  
                                                            
21 Coffey and Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 194. 
 
22 Coffey and Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 201. 
 
23 Coffey and Tsosie, Rethinking the Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine, 201. 
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 Porter refers to autonomous constitutional tribal governments, meaning 
those tribal governments that lost autonomy through the adoption of 
constitutional elements foreign to pre-colonial tribal governing structures.24   If 
Porter is correct, that Tribal Nations can carry the belief that they are 
sovereigns, then sovereign Tribal Nations could indeed write an autonomous 
constitution with a purpose separate from the interests of the U.S.  However, 
Tribal Nations would have to be explicit in their separation from federal 
authority, and according to Porter, such action would require the recognition 
of tribal sovereignty not only within the Tribal Nation itself, but from the U.S. 
According to Adams, autonomy would be a passing phase.  This is the 
paradigm shift for the theorists in this thesis.  Opposed to the re-conceptualist 
and rejection-conceptualist thought, Adams argues that a deeply internal or 
cultural initiative fails to make the necessary political moves away from 
dependence upon a central, non-Indigenous governing authority.  Warning 
against an entirely cultural nationalism, Adams writes: 
Since the cultural awakening is only one stage of liberation, steps must 
be taken to ensure that the national consciousness will develop its 
political aspect as well.  There is danger in nationalism if this transition 
is not made at the right time, because colonized people can quickly 
                                                            
24 Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Government Reform, 81.  Autonomous 
constitutional governments refer to tribal governments that have written elements derived 
from the U.S. constitution.  Porter provides evidence of the autonomous constitutional 
government in the Seneca and Cherokee Nations, each of which experienced a great amount 
of interaction and trade with the developing U.S.  
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become involved in cultural nationalism, which is a move backward to 
further oppression.25     
 
Adams believes that a purely cultural initiative will inevitably emerge as a 
caricature of cultural celebration.  Quoting Adams further:  
Cultural nationalism is a reactionary nationalism that forms part of the 
ideology of imperialism…it involves the revival of indigenous native 
traditions and tribalism…The danger in this is that it might begin to 
sever any links with a progressive liberation ideology.  The idea that a 
return to traditional Indian customs and worship will free us from the 
shackles of colonial domination is deceptive – a return to this kind of 
traditional worship is a reactionary move and leads to greater 
oppression, rather than to liberation.  Cultural nationalism is more than 
behaving and believing as traditional Indians; it is a return to extreme 
separatism in the hope that colonial oppression will automatically go 
away.  The emphasis is upon worship and the performance of ritual 
behavior, not upon politics and liberation.26 
 
According to Adams, “[l]liberation demands are based on obtaining autonomy 
in native communities and throwing off the domination of government 
bureaucrats.”27  By this line of reasoning, the demands for autonomy, as in 
freedom from bureaucratic domination, is a goal that has not been fully 
achieved.  Once autonomy is obtained, the overall political objective of 
liberation from capitalism should be realized.  
                                                            
25 Adams, Prison of Grass, 169 – 170. 
 
26 Adams, Prison of Grass, 170. 
 
27 Adams, Prison of Grass, 169. 
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The strongest argument against achieving autonomy is in its 
implication:  that it must be granted by a sovereign to a non-self-governing 
entity.  Tribal Nations have been extended self-government.  Therefore, 
negotiating for autonomy, or freedom from bureaucratic domination that 
serves the interests of the central non-Indigenous authority, will take place 
within the very dominant colonial discourse in which Indigenous theorists 
struggle with sovereignty and self-government.   
 Based on the arguments of the Indigenous theorists in this thesis, tribal 
sovereignty cannot be legitimately expressed unless Tribal Nations define it in 
their own terms. Further, the legitimacy of a non-Indigenous government’s 
sovereignty cannot be recognized until that government has recognized the 
legitimacy of tribal sovereignty.  The concept of autonomy however, may 
provide a theoretical space in which Indigenous theorists expand the concept 
of sovereignty to match their cultural orientations, but autonomy is unlikely to 
undo the political and psychological attachments to sovereignty that Tribal 
Nations have developed.   
As this section has evaluated, the Indigenous theorists are critical of 
self-government.  Yet, internationally, autonomy has been understood as self-
government.  As chapter 1 points out, the U.S. government used the 
European international “doctrine of discovery” to manipulate and control tribal 
sovereignty.  Based on this experience, Tribal Nations must be careful with 
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using a concept with such close affiliations to international use as it applies to 
ethnic minority struggles for local administration while the common interests 
are managed by a central political authority.      
To conclude this section and chapter, this thesis closes with 
recommendations put forth by Adams.  Adams recognized that his language 
was often called “too political, pejorative, and rhetorical.”  However, he does 
not apologize.28  Adams argues that Métis and Tribal Nations should develop 
counter-consciousness and unite with the working class and all individuals to 
seek liberation from imperialism, colonialism, and capitalism.    
Adams understood that class structure is more difficult to determine in 
Tribal Nations because of the interaction of tribal customs, as well as the 
remnants of traditional Indian spirituality and communal societies.29  Adams 
believes that liberation must go beyond racial and nationalist themes.  For this 
purpose, Adams recommended the following model as a plan for political 
liberation: 
To link the local communities together, a provincial coordination 
committee could be created from among the representatives of the 
local councils.  However, this coordinating committee would not be 
given any authority over local organizations.  Its primary function would 
be to channel information to local communities and to develop political 
analyses that would contribute to the understanding of the Indian/Métis 
liberation.  It would synthesize the activities of the various local 
                                                            
28 Adams, A Tortured People, 8. 
 
29 Adams, Prison of Grass, 123. 
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councils and broadcast them at a provincial or national level, but the 
coordinating committee would have no authority over the direction of 
the movement or over any local council.  There is no room for an elite 
leadership.30  
 
Following Adams’ recommendations, the political analyses developed by the 
provincial coordinating committee should embrace a deep decolonization 
strategy for eliminating the state ideology of capitalism.  Adams writes:   
We have to do this by working in all levels in the liberation struggle.  
For instance, some members are able to work at the neighborhood 
level in simple organizational and education work, while others can 
work in a broader way, mobilizing for civil-rights actions and extra-
parliamentary confrontations.  Finally, there must be a group of natives 
who are willing and able to work at the sophisticated level of guerilla 
warfare, both urban and rural.31 
 
Adams has presented a practical recommendation for Tribal Nations.  Adams 
reinforces the practical implications of sovereignty and autonomy.  Rather 
than arguing over their theoretical conceptualizations, Adams steps beyond 
sovereignty and autonomy.       
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
30 Adams, Prison of Grass, 186. 
 
31 Adams, Prison of Grass, 187.  
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Chapter IV 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis has evaluated the dimensions and limitations in sovereignty 
and autonomy with respect to Tribal Nations.  This thesis has discussed four 
schools of thought to guide this evaluation:  the re-conceptualist, rejectionist, 
rejection-conceptualist, and the revolutionary-conceptualist.  The common 
thread shared in these schools of thought is that Indigenous theorists must 
expand the concepts of sovereignty or autonomy to fit the cultural and political 
orientations of Tribal Nations.   
This thesis has demonstrated that, at its core, autonomy cannot undo 
the political and psychological tensions created by sovereignty.  This thesis 
has determined that a sovereign entity may choose autonomy, but an 
autonomous entity cannot likely choose sovereignty.  Further, a liberating 
ethos may use the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy, but the practical 
implications of these concepts are limited by the dominant colonial discourse.  
In conclusion, Indigenous theorists continue to examine the political 
relationships that Tribal Nations are engaged with.  This theoretical work will 
substitute tribal perspectives wherever it is possible.  Indigenous theorists will 
continue to conceptualize the meaning and purpose of an inherent right to 
internal sovereignty separate from the overall goals and policies that conflict 
with tribal sovereignty in a federal system.  
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